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ADVERSE PoSSESSIo-AcQusIT o OF RIGHTS AGAINST TRUSTEE AND
CESTUI QUE TRUST.-STOLL V. SMITH (1916) 98 ATL. (MD.) 53o.-This
action was brought for specific performance of a contract of sale of
land. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's title which was based
upon adverse possession for eighty years under an unauthorized sale by a
trustee appointed by a court. Held, that adverse possession would run
even against a trustee appointed by the court so as to bar both legal and
equitable estates, and that the plaintiff had thereby acquired a good title.
According to modern decisions third persons may hold the trust estate
adversely to both the trustee and the cestui que trust so as to bar both.
Woodward v. Boro (1886) 84 Tenn. 678; Maddox v. Allen (1858) 58
Ky. 495; Young v. McNeill (1907) 78 S. C. 143; Cameron v. Hicks
(i9o6) 141 N. C. 21. For this purpose the trustee's possession is con-
sidered that of the cestui quetrust. Reynolds v. Sumner (1888) 126 Ill.
58. So, too, even though the cestui que trust is under some disability,
such as infancy or coverture. Walton v. Ketchum (1898) 152 Mo. 289;
Blake v. Allman (1858) 58 N. C. 407; Appel v. Childress (igog) 116
S. W. (Tex.) 129; contra, Hunter vt. Hunter (19o2) 63 S. C. 78. In
the principal case it was urged that, as the trustee had been appointed by
the court, the rule did not apply, possibly for the reason that as there
can be no adverse possession against the state, there should be none as
against the trustee appointed by it. The insufficiency of the reason for
such a distinction is apparent and the court refused to draw it. Accord,
Meek v,. Olpherts (1872) 100 U. S. 564.
S. J. T.
CARRIERs-LIABILrTY FOR PERSONAl. INJURIEs-PERsONS RIDING IN VIOLA-
TION OF INTERSTATE COmmEcE Acr.-IINoiS CENT. R. R. Co. r AL. v.
MESSINA (1916) 72 So. (MISS.) 779.-The plaintiff, by permission of the
defendant's engineer, was riding on the tender of an interstate passenger
train without paying fare. Through negligence of the defendant the train
was derailed and the plaintiff injured. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover for personal injuries, notwithstanding his presence on the train
was illegal and a misdemeanor under the Interstate Commerce Act (Act,
Feb. 4, 1887, c. lO4, St. 379, as amended by Act, June 29, i9o6, c. 3591,
34 St 584). Stevens, J., dissenting.
The deciding question in the present case is the status of the plaintiff
while riding upon this train. He was clearly not a passenger, since the
relation of carrier and passenger is based upon contract, express or
implied. Gardner v. New Haven & Northampton Co. (883) 51 Conn.
143; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. O'Keefe (1897) 168 Ill. 15.' A railroad
is liable for negligence to an invitee or a licensee riding by the invitation
or permission of an employee, where such employee has authority, express
or implied by his office, to give such invitation or permission. Whitehouse
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v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1877) Fed. Cas. No. 17,565. This cannot apply
to the principal case, as the engineer was without authority. Chicago &
Alton R. R. Co. v. Michie (1876) 83 Ill. 427; Robertson v. N. Y. & Erie
R. R. Co. (1856) 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 91. Plaintiff was then a trespasser,
and the only duty of the carrier to him was to abstain from wilful or
wanton injury. Clark v. Colorado & Northwestern R. R. Co. (i9o8) 165
Fed. 4o8; Purple v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (19o2) 114 Fed. 123. Espe-
cially is this true of one who rides upon a car which he knows, or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, is not designed for the
transportation of passengers. Morris v. Georgia R. & B. Co. (igo8)
131 Ga. 475; Radley v. Columbia Southern R. R. Co. (19o4) 44 Or. 332.
The fact that the plaintiff was also violating the law at the time of his
injury would not necessarily preclude his recovery in an action for
negligence. See McNeill v. Railroad Co. (1904) 135 N. C. 682; Duncan
v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co. (19o2) 113 Fed. 5o8. Such violation of law is
material only so far as it contributes in the same way to his injury as
does his trespassing.
E. J. M.
CAMUERs-NoN-DELivERy-REsTRAINT OF PRINCES.-THE KRoNPRIN-
ZESSIN CECELIE (igi6, CIu. CT. App.) 238 FED. 668.-The defendant
contracted with the plaintiffs respectively, to deliver shipments of gold
at London via Plymouth and at Paris via Cherbourg; but was not
to be liable for loss by "arrest and restraint of princes, rulers or
people." When still two days from Plymouth the master received a
telegram from the ship's owners at Bremen, stating, "War has broken
out with England, France and Russia. Turn back to New York." The
master turned back, putting into Bar Harbor, Me. The owners knew the
message to be false, but the master did not. Held, that this was a breach
of defendant's contract, for which plaintiffs were entitled to recover-
Putnam, J., dissenting.
An exception in a bill of lading inserted by the shipowner for his owrr
benefit will be construed most strongly against him. The Caledonia (i895)
157 U. S. i24; The Majestic (1897) 166 U. S. 375. A blockade is a
"restraint of princes," Geipel v. Smith (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 404; so also
an embargo, Rotch v. Edie (1795) 6 T. R. 413; and also a siege, Rodo-
canachi v. Elliot (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 518. But mere fear of war is not
a "restraint of princes." Forster v. Christie (i8og) ii East,.205. It would
seem then that the court was right in holding that there was no "restraint
of princes" in the principal case. The only case cited by the dissenting-
judge for the contrary view is one in which the deviation took place after
war was declared. The British & Foreign Ins. Co. v. The Sanday & Co.
[igi6] A. C. 65o. But the other defense, as indicated by the dissent-
ing opinion, might well have been sustained. The master of a ship at sea
is under a plain duty to take care of all interests intrusted to him. Notara
v. Henderson (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 225. A deviation from the ordinary
course of a voyage, if reasonably necessary for the safety of the ship
or cargo, as, for example, saving human life, is not a breach of the
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contract of affreightment. Kish v. Taylor [III] I K. B. 625. But
the master must act in good faith and exercise his best discretion for the
benefit of all concerned. New England Insurance Co. v. The Sarah Ann
(i83g) 13 Pet. (U. S.) 400; The Amelie (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 27. In
the principal case the court came to the conclusion that the captain
exercised no discretion, but merely obeyed the order of the owners, and
that his action could be justified only if it fell within the stipulated
exception. This is a question to be answered from all the circumstances,
but the conclusion does not seem entirely necessary. If the shipmaster
had known the actual stiuation, and had pursued exactly the same course
on his own initiative, he would have been justified in fact, especially when
it appears that the delivery of the gold of the National City Bank would
have brought him into Cherbourg only a day before the actual declaration
of war.
F. W. D.
CONTRACTS-IMPoSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCF.-BERG v. ERICKSON (I916)
234 FED. 817.-E, a resident of Kansas, showed B, a resident of Texas,
who knew nothing of Kansas conditions, certain pastures into which he
proposed to put B's cattle, and contracted to furnish plenty of good
grass, salt and water during the grazing season, for which B agreed to
pay him $7 per head. The worst drought ever known in Kansas made
it impossible for E to furnish plenty of good grass in July, August,
September and October, although he furnished plenty during May and
June, and sufficient the other months to keep the cattle alive. Held, that
E was not absolved from his contract by the unprecedented drought.
An act of God will excuse the non-performance of a duty created by
law but not one created by contract. Davidson v. Gaskill (1912) 121
Pac. (Okl.) 649; Worthington v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. (1874) 41
Conn. 372. But an exception is made where the parties contracted on
the basis of the continued existence of a person or thing, and where the
subject matter of the contract is destroyed. Howell v. Coupland (1876)
I Q. B. D. 258; Singleton v. Carrol (1831) 22 Am. Dec. (Ky.) 95. Where
a contract called for a minimum quantity of peaches, to be grown in
specific orchards which the defendant's agents had inspected, failure
of performance in full, due to an unexpected drought, was excused.
Ontario v. Cutting Packing Co. (igoi) 134 Cal. 21. It would seem that the
principal case.might have been decided in the same way, since the parties
presumably contracted for specific grass, in the sense that it was to be
grown on the lands in question.
J. I. S.
EVIDENCE-PRIILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION-COMPUL.SORY INFOR-
MATION AS TO AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS.-STATE V. STERRIN (1916) g8 ATL.
(N. H.) 482.-Defendant was convicted of violating a statute requiring
an automobile driver, knowing he has injured a person, to return to the
scene of the accident, and give his name, address, license number, and
other information to any person demanding the same. Defendant con-
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tended that the statute violated that part of the New Hampshire Consti-
tition, Bill of Rights, art. 15, which provides that "no subject shall . . .
be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself." Held, that
the statute was constitutional.
The principal case, though the first in its jurisdiction, seems to represent
the general rule. Ex parte Diller (1914) 142 Pac. (Cal.) 797; People v.
Rosenheimer (1913) 209 N. Y. X15; Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo.
632. The fundamental basis for the decision in the principal case does not
involve the question, whether such information as the defendant was
required to give, constituted evidence, thus bringing him within the exemp-
tion expressed by the state constitution, but the broader proposition of
waiver. When one accepts the statutory privilege of operating a motor
vehicle he subjects himself to the condition attached. Ex parte Kneedler,
supra. A state might prohibit the operation of motor vehicles altogether
on public highways. People v. Diller, supra; People v. Rosenheitner,
supra. A fortiori the state may regulate their operation. An analogy is
presented where an accused in a criminal action takes the witness stand.
He thereby waives his privilege of not giving incriminating evidence
against himself on cross-examination. State v. Danforth (i9os) 73 N. H.
215. Many cases bear out the principle of waiver. State v. Henwood
(19oo) 123 Mich. 317; State v. Davis (igio) 69 S. E. (W. Va.) 639.
It is submitted, therefore, that the decision in the principal case is correct
on the theory of waiver of the constitutional privilege.
L. W. B.
EVIDENcE-SUBSTANTIVE LAw-ADMISSIBILITY OF ORAL WARRANTIES
VARYING A WRITTEN CoNTRAcT.-rTENHOUSE-WINTERSON AUTOMOBILE
Co. v. KISsNER (1916) 98 ATI. (MD.) 361.-The defendant, vendor of an
automobile truck, wrote the contract of sale upon a blank form of the
manufacturer with whom the plaintiff vendee supposed he was dealing.
Not until the second payment was made did vendee discover that the
defendant was the true party in interest. Held, that the defendant's oral
warranties accompanying the written contract of sale as to the quality
and condition of the truck were admissible despite the defendant's objec-
tion that they tended to vary the terms of a written contract.
Evidence of an oral warranty relating to an article which is the subject
matter of a written contract of sale is generally inadmissible. Osgood v.
Davies (1841) I8 Me. 146; Hahn v. Doolittle (1864) 18 Wis. 196. But
extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove the written contract is not
the real agreement. Gottfried v. Bray (i9o7) 208 Mo. 652; Ginther v.
Townsend (i9IO) 78 Atl. (Md.) 908; Colonial Park Estates v. Massart
(i9io) 112 Md. 648. There is no doubt that, upon learning that the
defendant was the true vendor, the plaintiffs could have avoided the con-
tract and recovered the payment already made. Cox v. Prentice (I815)
3 M. & S. 344; Lippincott v. Whitman (1877) 83 Pa. St. 244; Ballard v.
Lyons (911) 114 Minn. 264; Selby v. Watson (I908) 137 Ia. 97. Or
they might well be entitled to set up the true agreement with the defend-
ant, consisting of both the written and oral stipulations, were it not for
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the fact that the subsequent payments on account would seem to ratify the
contract as it existed in its written form. Bell v. Keepers (1888) 39 Kan.
1o5; Dennis v. Jones (x888) 44 N. J. Eq. 513; Blackman v. Wright (1897)
169 U. S. 243.
R. L. S.
GUARDIAN AND WARD--TRusT COMPANY AS GUARDAN OF THE PaRSON.-
MURPHREE v. HANSON (1916) 72 So. (ALA.) 437.-Letters of guardian-
ship had been issued to a trust company whose charter provided that it
might act as guardian. The respondent as its agent had taken personal
charge of the infant. Suit was then brought by the nearest relative of
the child to be appointed its guardian. Held, that the letters to the cor-
poration were void so far as they purported to give authority and control
over the person.
At common law a corporation could not act as guardian, administrator,
or even as trustee; but it may do so by legislative authority. Equitable
Trust Company v. Garis (1899) 19o Pa. St. 54; Johnson v. Johnson
(1889) 88 Ky. 275. Charter grants of privileges to corporations should
be construed strictly. Chenango Bridge Company v. Binghampton Bridge
Company (1865) 3 Wall (U. S.) 51. However, where a power is
expressly and unambiguously stated, the courts should give effect to
it. Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Gaines (188o) 3 Fed. 266. To claim
in the principal case, in which the corporation is given power to "act as
executor, administrator, guardian, and receiver," that guardianship of
the estate only and not of the person is meant, seems to place a strained
construction upon the statute. It is the duty of the courts to construe
laws, not to create or amend them under the guise of construction. Ex
parte Pittman (9o9) 31 Nev. 43. The objections to entrusting the person
of a minor to the custody of a corporation are not necessarily vital and
may prove. altogether imaginary. Minnesota Loan & Trust Company v.
Beebe (1889) 40 Minn. 7.
F. L. McC.
MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATioNs-NuwSANCE-PowER TO ABATE-FOWLs RUN-
NING AT LARGE.-MEuRiLL v. CITY OF VAN BUREN (I916) 188 S. W. (ARK.)
537.-A statute gave cities and towns power to prevent injury and annoy-
ance within the limits of the corporation from anything offensive, etc.,
and power to cause any nuisance to be abated. An ordinance was passed
declaring the running at large of fowls within the corporation limits
unlawful and a nuisance, and making their owner guilty of a misdemeanor.
Held, that the ordinance was valid. McCulloch, C. J., dissenting.
Such general authority as that conferred by the above statute does not
empower a municipal corporation to declare a nuisance per se anything
not such at common law. State v. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. (19o3)
i6o Ind. 45. But public nuisances are not confined to nuisances per se,
i. e., to wrongs in derogation of public morals and decency, whose loca-
tion and results are immaterial. They also comprise a class of things
which by virtue of their location or the extensiveness of their results
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have a common injurious effect upon many. Ex parte Foote (igoi) 7o
Ark. 12. These latter also, a municipality may prohibit generally, e. g.,
the growth of high weeds on city lots, City of St. Louis v. Gait (I9O3)
179 M. 8; or the maintenance of a jackass within the hearing of the
populace, ex parte Foote, supra. That is, the courts will sustain a liberal
discretion in declaring a given thing, innocent in itself, to be always a
nuisance in given circumstances. But should a municipality, overstepping
its discretion, prohibit by ordinance, as a nuisance, a thing capable of
being inoffensively conducted, any abatement must take place not as of
a prohibited thing under the ordinance, but as of a nuisance at common
law on the facts of the individual case. See People v. Busse (i9o9) 24o
Ill. 338. The decision of the principal case might be maintained on the
ground that the use of the streets may be prohibiited for any purpose
except those for which highways are commonly and necessarily used.
State v. Iams (I907) iii N. W. (Neb.) 6o4. But the argument of the
dissent seems the sounder: unrestrained chickens are not nuisances per se,
nor yet in a class with the jackass; and are not therefore, to be prohibited
sweepingly, but should have their offensiveness determined in each par-
ticular set of circumstances.
K. N. L.
PuBInc SEavi x CoRPoRATIoNs-DIscONTINUAIrCE OF SERvIcE wITHOUT
NOTIcE-TENDiE OF PAYMENT.-LITTLE ROCK Ry. & ELEcTRic Co. v. LEADFR
Co. (I916) I88 S. W. (ARK.) ii82.-An electric company's contract with
the consumer provided for discontinuance without notice upon non-pay-
ment of its bill within ten days from date of bill. The company discon-
tinued service after more than ten days had elapsed, although the con-
sumer tendered payment of the proper amount at that time. Held, that
the consumer was entitled to notice and a reasonable opportunity to pay
before discontinuance despite the terms of the contract.
A public service corporation under the power to make reasonable regu-
lations concerning service, may require payment in advance. Jones,
Telegraph and Telephone Companies, sec. 431. And it is not a discrimina-
tion to require this of some, while extending credit to others. Vaught v.
East Tennessee Tel. Co. (IgIo) 128 Tenn. 318. As to indebtedness already
incurred, the majority rule is that a company may refuse to furnish
former consumers until it is paid. State ex rel. Latshaw v. Duluth (r9o8)
io5 Minn. 472; Buffalo County Telephone Company v. T.irner (xgo8) 82
Neb. 841. The minority view is that public service corporations must
supply customers who are willing to pay for future services, even though
they refuse to pay for past ones. Crutnley v. Watauga Water Co. (1897)
99 Tenn. 42o. This theory, that insistence upon payment of past debts
before continuing service is an unreasonable discrimination on the part
of public service corporations, has been followed by Arkansas. South-
western Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Murphy (II) ioo Ark. 546; Southwestern
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher (1912) io2 Ark. 547. The latter decision
was reversed on the ground that a fine imposed on the company was
without due process of law, the U. S. Supreme Court arguing strongly
by way of dictum, that the regulation was reasonable. Southwestern
252 YALE LAW JOURNAL
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher (1915) 238 U. S. 482. The stipulation in the
principal case would seem justifiable, for the contract itself and the bill
furnish sufficient notice for the ordinary man. Service to the public will
suffer if everyone can force a company to begin to take out connections
in order to secure payment, and can defeat even this by a belated tender
of the amount due. It does not necessarily follow that the delayed pay-
ment of one's back debts is a satisfaction of a contract previously broken.
If this decision is to be justified, it must be on the ground that the pro-
vision was designed to be only a method of enforcing the rental charge,
and that public policy will not permit such a corporation to enforce its
contract to the letter, when the consumer is willing to pay the amount
owed at the time the contract was broken. Royal v. Cordele (igog)
132 Ga. 125.
J. E. H.
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONES-ERoR IN TRANSmISSION OF MESSAGE-
LIABILTY TO ADDRESSEE.-PENOBScOT FISH Co. v. W. U. TEL. Co. (i9i6)
98 ATL. (CONN.) 341.-The defendant telegraph company accepted in
Connecticut a message to be transmitted to the plaintiff in Maine. By
the defendant's negligence the message was delivered as an order for
ten barrels of lobsters instead of one barrel. Plaintiff sent ten barrels,
but the consignee refused to accept them. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover damages caused by the defendant's error in trans-
mission.
The offeror is bound by the terms of a telegraphic message as received
by the offeree. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co. (902) 114
Ga. 576; Ayer v'. IV. U. Tel. Co. (1887) 79 Me. 493; contra, Pepper v.
W. U. Tel. Co. (1889) 87 Tenn. 554. If the message appears on its
face to be for the benefit of the sendee, he may sue the company as
beneficiary of the contract between the company and the sender Wads-
worth v'. W. U. Tel. Co. (1888) 86 Tenn. 695; W. U. v'. Ports (1907)
12o Tenn 37. But the plaintiff in the principal case is not such a
beneficiary as to entitle him to sue on the contract. He may, however,
bring an action in tort. Young v'. W. U. Tel. Co. (1889) IO7 N. C.
370; Stewart, Morehead & Co. v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co. (i9o6) i3i
Ga. 3. The addressee in such an action must show legal damage.
Rose v. U. S. Tel. Co. (1867) 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 4o8. No legal damage
is shown in the principal case since the offeror was bound by the message
reaching the plaintiff. The decision can be justified then, only on the
ground that it prevents circuity of action by allowing the addressee to
recover from the company. The court in the principal case evidently
assumed that the negligent act of the defendant was committed in
Connecticut.
J.N.M.
WILLS-TRusT ESTATE-ASSIGNMENT TO WIFE.-WEST v. BURKE (igi6)
113 N. E. (N. Y.) 561.-The plaintiff, on his wife's action for divorce,
assigned to her in trust for life, $15,ooo, which was to be held by the execu-
tors and trustees under the will of his father to be paid him out of the
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residuary estate when he should reach the age of thirty-five years, and
$ioo,ooo of the principal of the residuary estate which was to come to him
when he should reach forty. These assignments were approved by the
court, and also confirmed in the trustees' action for instructions. Subse-
quently the plaintiff brought an action to obtain adjudication, that at the
execution of such assignments, the legal title was vested in the trustees
under the will, and to have the assignments set aside. Held, that in the
absence of mistake, duress or fraud, the plaintiff could not maintain
such an action.
In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the will, a legatee
may assign, or a devisee convey his interest. Gardner, Wills, 624;
Hogan v. Bell (1837) 4 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 286; Bauernschinidt v.
Bauernschmidt (1904) 97 Md. 35; Cecil v. Negro Rose (i86i) 7 Md.
92; Sanders v. Soutter (1903) 136 N. Y. 97. Such an assignment duly
executed, passes all the rights of the assignor but nothing more. Clapp
v. Meresole (1863) 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 66i. The weight of authority
seems to be that even a future contingent interest in personalty is alien-
able. Lent v. Howard (1883) 89 N. Y. i69; Cochrane v. Schell (1894)
N. Y. 516. The court in the principal case apparently proceeded on the
theory that the so-called trustees were really only bailees possessing
certain rights, powers, privileges, etc., since it held that the legal title
although incomplete was in the beneficiary. However, if the legal title
had been vested in the trustees the equitable title could have been assigned
under the New York statute. Personal Property Law (Consol. Laws,
c. 4) sec. i5.
G. S., JR.
